Modeling The World: Part II

The last post was about the hypothetical-predictive kind of model. In that post, I talked about the three basic problems you find in that kind of model. But the main thing going for such a model is that it seems to be the best you have; it has utility value as far as it can be shown that it appears to correlate with experiences, events and expectations.

But there are at least two other models that a well-rounded education should consider. The second model is the historical-legal model, and the basis for this model is the correlation of singular pieces of evidence.

Consider the earlier model and what might be a science experiment: in such a case, the scientist records as much as he can about pertinent (as far as he knows) conditions and what was done – then if necessary, the experiment can be reproduced, and if the results agree, it can be seen as a verified event.

In the historical-legal model, it is accepted that it is unlikely to have two pieces of evidence being exactly the same, which is the holy grail of the first. The second model provides for multiple pieces of evidence being different but corroborative. It also assumes that there is no possibility of repeating the scenario exactly, since the human world is involved and this is famously fluid, far too complex for the first kind of model.

So what kind of truth derives from this model? Mostly the truth of what happened, and what events transpired after something happened. A chronology is established. Whether cause can be attributed may not be the point, but broad phenomena and broad origins can be postulated looking back. We can talk about the causes of the Second World War not because we have done 100 simulations of it and they all behave the same way; we can talk about these causes because we have had a single instance, and it is richly attested to by a wealth of facts.

But what caused the Second World War? It is a complex phenomenon, not a single thing. It is beyond reproduction. It is beyond the analysis of forensic science. Come to think of it, it is like asking what caused the Great Depression or the Alexandrian Empire to happen. We can advance an hypothesis, if you like, against earnest of future discovery of the past. We can say that the evidence shows that events X and Y happened, and that the connection between them was one of direct or indirect consequence, or not. And we can say, if Z happened because of X and/or Y, we should be able to find a document or artifact which shows this to be true or not true.

Essentially, the historical-legal method is one in which you set up a case and display the supporting exhibits. Someone else will display other exhibits. Eventually, you will develop a model which accounts well for all the exhibits. But remember, the past is a different country, and you may not have the required visa for a long stay. You may never be acculturated to it, or understand its difficulties. But you can build up a tapestry of how it might have been, based on the threads of evidence that you can find: primary accounts and second-hand reports; remains of what was used, consumed, made and lot; deeply-buried archives.

Then we subject everything to the inquisition: show the evidence that constitutes the proof of event A; the circumstantial likelihood of event B; the weight of positive evidence against the sharp edge of negative evidence. What does the jury say? Can we know what actually happened? It is not so much different from what happens in most courts of law.

How does this model the world we live in? Well, some assumptions can be made. The nature of humanity changes little; the nature of the world neither. Although the past is a different country with a different culture, it is what came before we did. In understanding the distance between the past and the present, we find the trajectory of human endeavour and all its passions.