Closed Systems, No Real Winners
The peril of having a closed system is twofold: firstly, there are no really closed systems in real life, as far as we can tell; secondly, a system that is treated as closed will eventually fall into a state of either stasis or equilibrium in which no new outcomes are possible, or in which there is only a very limited set of outcomes.
This was highlighted in the local morning paper's editorial today. Atlantis, as we all know, claims that (and acts as if) it is a meritocracy. But the editorial today noted, quoting Amartya Sen, that "meritocracy is an intuitively appealing but 'essentially underdefined' principle. It is underdefined because much hinges on what counts as merit. And in a meritocracy, as in any other system, the idea of the good, and therefore of merit, is determined by that system's winners."
This is exacerbated, of course, if the system is essentially a closed system or is treated as such. It is a simple way to perdition: since the state is successful, the successors must have the same qualities as the existing winners. If they have different qualities, they must be losers (not to put too fine a point on it). Hence, just as with the College of Cardinals or any other cadre-type system, we should use the winners to select more winners by criteria similar to those by which they themselves were elected, selected, nominated, or chosen with divine imprimatur.
Why perdition? Because the system is not truly closed. As the world changes, if there is not some scope for variation, the unnatural selection will lead to 'winners' who actually cannot cope with the world as it turns out to be. It is even worse if your first iteration of winners was actually a class of 'winners by accident', 'winners by determination', or 'winners by default'. In the first case, you got lucky and are expecting to continue to be lucky. In the second case, you decide who should win and so they did. In the third case, you had nobody else, and what you had was sufficient for the win.
One problem is that the world is interconnected. It is not a purely statistical crapshoot. If you were a winner (and if you created losers, especially), the world will adapt to your win and attempt to emulate, dominate, or otherwise neutralise or defeat your strategy. What was an advantage in the first iteration may become a liability in successive situations. Winners by accident are not normally repeat winners unless they quickly figure out how they won.
Another problem is that the intellectual inbreeding or culling that is likely to occur is memetically fatal to most (if not all) cultures in the long run. You might argue that what succeeded in the past should succeed in the future with some legitimacy, using an inductive approach (an 'all swans I have seen so far are black, so the next one will also be black' approach). Even if it is true, the best you get is stasis. But what if the next swan is white, and you have killed all the observers who would look for a white swan? You might starve to death in the midst of plenty, deprived of your swan diet by disbelief. Winners by determination (or termination) are inherently limited.
And finally, there is the problem of mediocrity. People who win by not having opposition may eventually become unable to identify what is better or what is worse. After all, they are winners, and they never needed to be better than what they are. They never faced a credible and determined opposition, they were never exposed to serious intellectual cut and thrust in a public arena. If you select your future winners and leaders from people like these, you are doomed to the fate of the mediocre – being moderately successful in all things but never emerging from the middle of the statistical distribution appropriate to your situation.
What then is to be done? The first step is to aim for a perspective which treats systems as likely to be open. The second step is to develop talent with an eye to memetic diversity and distribution. And the third step is to stop selecting people who are either like yourself or who are predisposed to agree with you most of the time.
This was highlighted in the local morning paper's editorial today. Atlantis, as we all know, claims that (and acts as if) it is a meritocracy. But the editorial today noted, quoting Amartya Sen, that "meritocracy is an intuitively appealing but 'essentially underdefined' principle. It is underdefined because much hinges on what counts as merit. And in a meritocracy, as in any other system, the idea of the good, and therefore of merit, is determined by that system's winners."
This is exacerbated, of course, if the system is essentially a closed system or is treated as such. It is a simple way to perdition: since the state is successful, the successors must have the same qualities as the existing winners. If they have different qualities, they must be losers (not to put too fine a point on it). Hence, just as with the College of Cardinals or any other cadre-type system, we should use the winners to select more winners by criteria similar to those by which they themselves were elected, selected, nominated, or chosen with divine imprimatur.
Why perdition? Because the system is not truly closed. As the world changes, if there is not some scope for variation, the unnatural selection will lead to 'winners' who actually cannot cope with the world as it turns out to be. It is even worse if your first iteration of winners was actually a class of 'winners by accident', 'winners by determination', or 'winners by default'. In the first case, you got lucky and are expecting to continue to be lucky. In the second case, you decide who should win and so they did. In the third case, you had nobody else, and what you had was sufficient for the win.
One problem is that the world is interconnected. It is not a purely statistical crapshoot. If you were a winner (and if you created losers, especially), the world will adapt to your win and attempt to emulate, dominate, or otherwise neutralise or defeat your strategy. What was an advantage in the first iteration may become a liability in successive situations. Winners by accident are not normally repeat winners unless they quickly figure out how they won.
Another problem is that the intellectual inbreeding or culling that is likely to occur is memetically fatal to most (if not all) cultures in the long run. You might argue that what succeeded in the past should succeed in the future with some legitimacy, using an inductive approach (an 'all swans I have seen so far are black, so the next one will also be black' approach). Even if it is true, the best you get is stasis. But what if the next swan is white, and you have killed all the observers who would look for a white swan? You might starve to death in the midst of plenty, deprived of your swan diet by disbelief. Winners by determination (or termination) are inherently limited.
And finally, there is the problem of mediocrity. People who win by not having opposition may eventually become unable to identify what is better or what is worse. After all, they are winners, and they never needed to be better than what they are. They never faced a credible and determined opposition, they were never exposed to serious intellectual cut and thrust in a public arena. If you select your future winners and leaders from people like these, you are doomed to the fate of the mediocre – being moderately successful in all things but never emerging from the middle of the statistical distribution appropriate to your situation.
What then is to be done? The first step is to aim for a perspective which treats systems as likely to be open. The second step is to develop talent with an eye to memetic diversity and distribution. And the third step is to stop selecting people who are either like yourself or who are predisposed to agree with you most of the time.
Labels: Leadership, Management, Meritocracy, Talent Development
etched with acid at 8:25:00 pm
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