Ways of Knowing (Part I)
I was having a mini-tutorial the other day, at a most congenial spot, with very congenial people. The idea of 'ways of knowing' came up, somewhat pixilated by the standard textbook approaches which you can find in various systems of study.
It has always struck me that there are some key ways of distinguishing the ways that we know (or claim to know) things. The most important of these (in terms of thinking about thinking) is probably whether the means of knowing is intrinsic or extrinsic. The test of this is whether the method and means are part of you or not.
While some nits can be picked, the fact is that sensory perception and emotion are intrinsic; the former arises from your personal anatomy and the latter from your personal physiology. In the former, some sort of environmental effect impinges on an element of your sensorium (your ear, eye, skin, hair, cell membrane, whatever) and triggers a response which you perceive. Whether this perception is real or not is another matter, but it is tentatively added to what you label 'knowledge'. (Note: throughout this post, we'll assume there is some sort of reality that correlates to perception.)
On the other hand, language and other forms of reasonably reliable person-to-person communication (let's just call it 'language'), and reasoning structures (codes, relational axioms etc — let's just call it 'reason') are extrinsic. There's no way to tell what your intrinsic reasoning is unless you codify it, and the way you codify it makes it communicable. If you can't communicate or codify it (can't express it through language or reason), then it's an intuitive response — something intrinsic until made more explicit (if ever). But the hallmark of an extrinsic means of knowing is that is designed so that one person can reliably share knowledge with another and both can agree on the approximate value of that knowledge.
Some people think of faith as a way of knowing; I'd say that faith is easily defined as belief in something while lacking in sufficient evidence for it. If you had sufficient evidence for it, it wouldn't be faith — it would be reason. Faith is intrinsic; there is no way to share it directly, just as in the case of sensory perception or emotion.
It has always struck me that there are some key ways of distinguishing the ways that we know (or claim to know) things. The most important of these (in terms of thinking about thinking) is probably whether the means of knowing is intrinsic or extrinsic. The test of this is whether the method and means are part of you or not.
While some nits can be picked, the fact is that sensory perception and emotion are intrinsic; the former arises from your personal anatomy and the latter from your personal physiology. In the former, some sort of environmental effect impinges on an element of your sensorium (your ear, eye, skin, hair, cell membrane, whatever) and triggers a response which you perceive. Whether this perception is real or not is another matter, but it is tentatively added to what you label 'knowledge'. (Note: throughout this post, we'll assume there is some sort of reality that correlates to perception.)
On the other hand, language and other forms of reasonably reliable person-to-person communication (let's just call it 'language'), and reasoning structures (codes, relational axioms etc — let's just call it 'reason') are extrinsic. There's no way to tell what your intrinsic reasoning is unless you codify it, and the way you codify it makes it communicable. If you can't communicate or codify it (can't express it through language or reason), then it's an intuitive response — something intrinsic until made more explicit (if ever). But the hallmark of an extrinsic means of knowing is that is designed so that one person can reliably share knowledge with another and both can agree on the approximate value of that knowledge.
Some people think of faith as a way of knowing; I'd say that faith is easily defined as belief in something while lacking in sufficient evidence for it. If you had sufficient evidence for it, it wouldn't be faith — it would be reason. Faith is intrinsic; there is no way to share it directly, just as in the case of sensory perception or emotion.
Labels: Epistemology, Knowledge
etched with acid at 1:07:00 pm
2 Comments:
If you lack sufficient evidence, where comes the justification? Is justification still necessary then?
One should define 'justification'. 'To justify' simply means 'to (make) fit' — this is why in word-processing we use it to mean 'alignment to or around a fixed vertical', and why the word 'adjust' means 'correct to the point at which it fits'.
So if we lack sufficient evidence, but we have enough evidence to persuade us, the justification can be provided by emotion or experience or extrapolation not amounting to a formula. This is why people try free kicks on goal from 30 yards out... *grin*
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